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Overview

- status up to (and including) 2015
- possible attack vectors
- integrity and authenticity
- verification architecture
- (non-)distributing GnuGP (and alternatives)
- Problems
- user experience
- key management

Status up to 2015

container checksum (md5) is available in the tlpdb

```
name 12many
...
containersize 2100
containermd5 .....
doccontainersize 375404
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```

▶ but ...

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but ... only used to restart an interrupted installation not for tlmgr update nor for normal installation!

Do we need better security?

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Verification of checksums (md5) In tlcritical for a few months before TL2016 was released, but not pushed out to 2015.

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
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
Cryptographic signatures


tlmgr downloads remote texlive.tlpdb

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tlmgr verifies authenticity of the tlpdb







Verification of authenticity

texlive.tlpdb

```
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name 12many
containerchecksum ...
name 2up
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```

texlive.tlpdb.sha512

 \rightarrow <128 hex digits> texlive.tlpdb

TEX Live 2016

Verification of authenticity

```
texlive.tlpdb
                              texlive.tlpdb.sha512
name 00texlive.config
                              <128 hex digits> texlive.tlpdb
name 12many
                              texlive.tlpdb.sha512.asc
containerchecksum ...
                              -- BEGTN PGP STGNATURE--
. . .
                              iQEVAwUBVyAV9kzhh3...
name 2up
                              r2mB9xEnR4o2SRBDNI...
containerchecksum ...
                              --END PGP SIGNATURE--
```

Signing key

- signed by Karl and my key (mine is also in the Debian keyring)
- actual signing subkey is used, main key is offline (in case of breach of TUG server we can revoke the sub-key)

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Why SHA512?

- currently considered uncompromisable (in contrast to MD5)
- will hopefully hold for several years (other options SHA256 etc)

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- Why sufficient? texlive.tlpdb gives authenticated information
- ▶ We actually check also the size (might delete that one!)

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- We don't want to support (and compile it) (but could go into private space like xz and wget!)
- Export and import restrictions, Waasenaar Agreement
 Export might be ok nowadays, but there are many counries the strictly forbid *import* of cryptographic software (India, France is a bit unclear, ...)

TUG does not want to get involved in legal battles (not funny) when sending DVDs to India or other countries.

Alternative for T_FX Live

Alternative for TEX Live

- installs binaries into tlpkg/installer/gpg/
- ► GnuPG binaries for Windows and Mac (both archs)
- already supported by TLU on Mac
- most big distributions have GnuPG (1 or 2) installed (both fine)
- ▶ the T_FX Live infrastructure already checks for the above location
- not affiliated with TUG (smile)
- maybe could be hosted at DANTE or some other server?



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Users' complains

reduce visibility of warnings/information shown, try to provide a unspectacular introduction of the feature

User experience – changes in the interface

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...
```

If not GnuPG is found the output is:

```
[~] tlmgr update --list --repository http://localhost/tlnet/
tlmgr: package repository http://localhost/tlnet/ (not verified)
...
```

Similar for multiple repositories

Key management

Aim: support alternative repositories

- ▶ tlmgr key action added
- allows listing, adding, removing of keys
- already in use (koma script, TeX JP, ...)

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- directly sign reduce one download?
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Thanks for your attention